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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1939, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared in State ex. rel. 
Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County,1 that the right to a jury trial 
guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution did not apply to civil 
commitment cases.2  Since then, thousands of Minnesotans have 
been sent to mental institutions and other facilities against their 
will, based only upon the ruling of a probate court judge.  Once 
committed to a state institution, their petitions for release are 
heard only by members of the judiciary.  Since it is hornbook law 
that a State supreme court is the final arbiter of the constitution of 
that state, the accepted wisdom has been that the right to a jury in 
civil commitment cases cannot exist in Minnesota.  Because the 
United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the question,3 the 
 
        †     Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law (Rory Duggan William 
Mitchell College of Law, J.D. expected 2003, provided valuable research assistance 
for this article). 
 1. 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940). 
 2. Id. at. 557, 287 N.W. at 297. 
 3. Although the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the civil commitment standards 
applied by the statute in Pearson, it did not rule on the jury trial issue decided by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Pearson.  In fact, the United States Supreme 
Court has never been presented with the issue since every case decided by the 
Court regarding civil commitment standards has arisen from state procedures 
based upon a jury verdict.  See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Kansas v. 
1
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Pearson ruling has remained unchallenged for more than half a 
century.  This article takes issue with that “accepted wisdom.” 
The first sections of this article will begin by briefly tracing the 
right to a jury trial from its roots in the Magna Carta and the 
Common Law of England.4  It will demonstrate that the jury was 
considered a necessary “bulwark” against government whenever 
loss of liberty was at issue in both criminal and civil proceedings, up 
to the adoption of the Seventh Amendment in 1791.  It will also 
show that the right to a civil jury when government sought to 
deprive a person of liberty was recognized in the constitutions of 
most of the original thirteen colonies, and is recognized in most 
states even today. 
The next section of the article will review the Minnesota 
Supreme Court civil jury jurisprudence from 1860 to the present.5  
It will show that, for more than 140 years, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has consistently held that the right to a jury that existed in 
the Minnesota Territory was part of the 1857 Constitution, and that 
this constitutional right to a jury trial cannot be altered by the 
Legislature or the courts.  The article will then review the right to a 
jury in civil commitment proceedings in the Minnesota Territory by 
showing that the Territorial Probate Court, which had original 
jurisdiction over civil commitment proceedings, included the right 
to a jury. 
 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993); 
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986); 
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 
(1979); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 
504 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).   
  Because this article focuses exclusively on the right to a jury under the 
Minnesota Constitution, the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, or 
under the Due Process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, is beyond 
its scope.  However, the Seventh Amendment “historical test,” which looks to the 
common law to determine the right to a jury, leads to the conclusion that civil 
commitments required a jury at common law, and would therefore, be required 
under the Seventh Amendment.  See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 
391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990).   
  In addition, the analysis of the right to a jury trial in serious criminal cases 
set out in Duncan v. Louisiana, which looks to the importance of that right in 
English Common Law and in the English Bill of Rights, supports a conclusion that 
the right to a jury in civil commitment proceedings is no less deserving of Due 
Process protections.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50(1971).  But see 
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1895) (rejecting a Due Process right to a jury when 
property is at issue). 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
2
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With this jurisprudential and historical foundation in place, 
the article will then examine the reasoning of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Pearson, and In re Vinstad v. State Board of Control,6 
which was cited as authority for the Pearson opinion and is the only 
other case that has addressed this issue, although in dicta.7  The 
article will show how Pearson was wrongly decided because it 
purports to eliminate a jury trial right that existed in the Minnesota 
Territory and was guaranteed by the 1857 Minnesota Constitution.8  
This article concludes that, irrespective of language in Pearson to 
the contrary, the Minnesota Constitutional right to a jury trial in 
civil commitment cases remains viable even today, and that 
thousands of persons have been, and are being, unconstitutionally 
deprived of their liberty in juryless civil commitment proceedings 
in Minnesota.9 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
At common law it was the practice to inquire whether a 
man was an idiot, or not, by the writ de idiota inquirendo 
[and, therefore, subject to civil commitment], in which 
proceeding there was the trial by jury.  The method of 
proving a man non compos was quite the same.10 
The ancient right to trial by jury, required whenever liberty 
was at issue, was first guaranteed in the Magna Carta in 1215, which 
provided that: “no freeman would be disseized, dispossessed or 
imprisoned except by judgment of his peers . . . .”11  Even before 
the Sixth and Seventh Amendments,12 English Common Law 
required a jury trial in both criminal and civil proceedings when 
liberty was at issue.13 
The common law divided individuals with mental disorders 
into two groups: the “idiot” or “natural fool” who lacked basic 
understanding from birth, and the “lunatic” who once possessed 
 
 6. 169 Minn. 264, 211 N.W. 12 (1926). 
 7. Pearson, 205 Minn. at 557, 287 N.W. at 303. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. See infra Part V. 
 10. In re McLaughlin, 102 A. 439, 439 (N.J. Ch. 1917) (citing 1 Blackstone’s 
Commentaries 303). 
 11. Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in 
Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 13 (1993) (citing the Magna Carta). 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, VII. 
 13. Arnold, supra note 11, at 13. 
3
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basic understanding but had subsequently lost such ability.14  As 
early as the fourteenth century, the sovereign was entitled to 
interfere with the liberty interest of those adjudged to be “idiots” or 
“lunatics” only after the mental status of the person in question was 
determined by a jury of twelve men, originally called the 
“folkmoot.”15  It was deemed “a part of the liberties . . . that the 
king may not enter upon or seize any man’s possessions upon bare 
surmises, without the intervention of a jury.”16  This investigatory 
inquest was called the writ de idiota inquiriendo.17 
Over time, English Common Law civil commitment 
procedures came to include a presentation of the petition for civil 
commitment to a chancellor commission, which was empowered to 
hear cases of “idiocy” and “lunacy” at the initial stage.18  Under this 
common law practice, a person brought before the Commission 
had the right to appeal or challenge the initial findings of the 
Commission by invoking the right to a jury trial.19  This common 
law right of appeal to a jury of twelve was codified in 1509 during 
the reign of Henry VIII.20  The right of appeal from the initial 
Commission findings was codified in 1548 by establishing that a 
traverse—a common law principle, which required a trial by jury—
was the means to challenge the initial determination of the 
Commission.21 
[W]hen application is made . . . for a commission of 
lunacy . . . a commission is issued under the great seal [of 
the sovereign], and the commissioners named.  Upon 
notice to them they issue a warrant to the sheriff, 
directing him to summon a jury and witnesses to attend a 
trial. . . .22 
 
 14. J.E. Macy, Annotation, Constitutional Right to Jury Trial in Proceeding for 
Adjudication of Incompetency or Insanity or for Restoration, 33 A.L.R.2d 1145, § 2 
(1954).  See also Vicki Gordon Kaufman, The Confinement of Mabel Jones: Is There a 
Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Commitment Proceedings?, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 103, 106 
(1978). 
 15. Macy, supra note 14, at § 2; Kaufman, supra note 14, at 106. 
 16. Phillips v. Moore, 100 U.S. 208, 212 (1879).  Since the condition of 
“lunacy” was thought to be temporary, the King merely held the land in trust, and 
profits from the land were used for support of the person and his family.  
Kaufman, supra note 14, at 106. 
 17. Macy, supra note 14, at § 2. 
 18. Macy, supra note 14, at § 2; Kaufman, supra note 14, at 6. 
 19. Kaufman, supra note 14, at 6. 
 20. Macy, supra note 14, at § 2. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Shumway v. Shumway, 2 Vt. 339, 341 (1829). 
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The British colonies in North America generally followed the 
English Common Law civil commitment requirements, including 
the right to inquest of trial by jury.  In a fashion similar to the 
historical test applied by the United States Supreme Court in Curtis 
v. Loether23 to determine the right to a jury trial in civil proceedings 
under the Seventh Amendment, the common law right to an 
inquest by a jury in commitment proceedings was retained in the 
jury trial requirements of the constitutions of most of the original 
thirteen colonies.24  The second constitution of Pennsylvania of 
 
 23. 415 U.S. 189 (1974). 
 24. Georgia:  “Freedom of the press and trial by jury to remain inviolate 
forever.”  GA. CONST. art. LXI (1777). 
 
Maryland: 
That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of 
England, and the trial by Jury, according that law, and to the benefit of 
such of the English statutes, as existed at the time of their first 
emigration, and which, by experience, have been found applicable to 
their local and other circumstances, and of such others as have been 
since made in England, or Great Britain, and have been introduced, 
used and practiced by the courts of law or equity; and also to acts of 
Assembly, in force on the first of June seventeen hundred and seventy-
four, except such as may have since expired, or have been or may be 
altered by facts of Convention, or this Declaration of Rights-subject, 
nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the 
Legislature of this State: and the inhabitants of Maryland are also 
entitled to all property, derived to them, from or under the Charter, 
granted by his Majesty Charles I. To Crecilius Calvert, Baron of 
Baltimore. 
MD. CONST. art. III (1776). 
 
New Jersey: 
That the Common Law of England, as well as so much of the statute 
law, as have been heretofore practiced in this Colony, shall still remain 
in force, until they shall be altered by a future law of the Legislature; 
such parts only excepted, as are repugnant to the rights and privileges 
contained in this Charter; and that the inestimable right of trial by jury 
shall remain confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without 
repeal, forever.   
N.J. CONST. art XXII (1776). 
 
North Carolina:  “That in all controversies at law, respecting property, the ancient 
mode of trial, by jury, is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and 
ought to remain sacred and inviolable.”   N.C. CONST. art. XIV (1776). 
 
New York: 
And this convention doth further ordain, determine, and declare, in 
the name and by the authority of the good people of this State, that 
5
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1790,25 and the third constitution of South Carolina of that same 
year,26 also preserved the common law right to inquest by jury in 
civil commitment proceedings. States which entered the Union 
after the original thirteen also have recognized that the right to a 
jury in civil commitments existed at common law, and was a 
necessary element of their own jury trial provisions.27  Numerous 
states have required jury trials in civil “sexual predator” 
commitment proceedings because such a right existed at the time 
their constitutions were enacted.28 
 
trial by jury, in all cases in which it hath heretofore been used in the 
colony of New York, shall be established and remain inviolate forever.  
And that no acts of attainder shall be passed by the legislature of this 
State for crimes, other than those committed before the termination of 
the present war; and that such acts shall not work a corruption of 
blood.  And further, that the legislature of this State shall, at no time 
hereafter, institute any new court or courts, but such as shall proceed 
according to the course of the Common Law.   
N.Y. CONST. art. XLI (1777). 
  
Pennsylvania:  “That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between 
man and man, the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held 
sacred.”  PA. CONST. art. XI (1776). 
 
South Carolina: 
That all suits and process depending in any court of law or equity may, 
if  either party shall be so inclined, be proceeded in and continued to a 
final ending, without being obliged to commence de nova.  And the 
judges of the courts of law shall cause jury-lists to be made, and juries 
to be summoned, as near as may be, according to the directions of the 
acts of the general assembly in such cases provided.   
S.C. CONST. art. XVIII (1776). 
 
Virginia:  “That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man 
and man, the ancient trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held 
sacred.”  VA. CONST. § 11 (1776). 
 
 25. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 6 (1790) (“That trial by jury shall be as heretofore, 
and the right thereof remain inviolate.”);  Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 
593, 597 (1999) (exemplifying that the right to a jury trial in civil commitment 
proceedings remains unchanged up to the present). 
 26. S.C. CONST. art. 9, § 6 (1790) (“The trial by jury, as heretofore used in this 
State . . . shall be forever inviolaby preserved.”). 
 27. See, e.g., TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 6 (1796) (“The right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate.”); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 15 (1876) (“The right to a jury trial shall 
remain inviolate.”); WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (1889) (“The right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate. . . .”); VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XIII (1777) (“That, in 
controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the parties 
have a right to a trial by jury; which ought to be held sacred.”). 
 28. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3706 (2001); CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 6602.5 
6
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III. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN MINNESOTA 
On its face, the Minnesota Constitution clearly has 
incorporated pre-existing jury trial rights within its provisions: 
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall 
extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in 
controversy.  A jury trial may be waived by the parties in all 
cases in the manner prescribed by law.29 
In a long line of cases beginning with Whallon v. Bancroft,30 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized two main effects of this 
clause.  First, it recognizes the right to a trial by jury as it existed in 
the Territory of Minnesota at the time the state constitution was 
adopted.31  Second, it recognized the continuation of the right to a 
jury trial unimpaired and inviolate.32  Wherever the right to a jury 
trial existed under the territorial laws, it continues to exist and may 
not be abridged by the Legislature.  The Legislature may expand 
the constitutional right to a jury trial, however it may not withdraw 
the right merely by codifying a common law cause of action.33 
As recently as last year, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in 
Abraham that the nature and character of the controversy as 
determined from all the pleadings and the relief sought determines 
whether an action is a “case at law,” and thus carries the attendant 
constitutional right to a jury trial.34  The term “case at law,” as used 
in the Minnesota Constitution, has been construed as referring to 
ordinary common law actions.35  Since the common law right to a 
 
(2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-109 (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545 (2001); 
FLA. STAT. § 394.916 (2002); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-802 (2002); IOWA CODE § 
229A.7 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.140, 
repealed by Act of 1968, ch. 90, § 63 (as interpreted by Denton v. Commonwealth, 
383 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1964)); MO. REV. STAT. § 632.495 (2001); N.Y. MENTAL 
HYG. LAW § 9.35 (McKinney 2002); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 44-48-90 (2001); TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.061 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-70.9 (2002); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.310 (2002); WIS. STAT. § 51.20 (2001); Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 733 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Page, 159 N.E.2d 82 (Mass. 
1959); Johnson v. Nelms, 100 S.W.2d 648 (Tenn. 1937); Shumway v. Shumway, 2 
Vt. 339 (1829). 
 29. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (1857). 
 30. 4 Minn. 109 (1860). 
 31. Id. at 113. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 354 (Minn. 2002). 
 34. Abraham, 639 N.W. 2d at 349.  See also Bond v. Welcome, 61 Minn. 43, 46, 
63 N.W. 3, 4 (1895) (the nature of the proceedings whether legal or equitable may 
be determined by the pleadings). 
 35. Hawley v. Wallace, 137 Minn. 183, 187, 163 N.W. 127, 129 (1917). 
7
Erlinder: Of Rights Lost and Rights Found: The Coming Restoration of the Ri
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
1_ERLINDER_FORMATTED_CURRENT.DOC 4/7/2003  11:03 AM 
1276 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:4 
jury trial in civil commitment proceedings has existed for centuries, 
such inquiry into the nature and character of the proceedings is 
unnecessary in the present case.  The constitutional right to a jury 
trial applies to all “cases at law,” regardless of whether the 
legislature has codified a new cause of action.  The aforementioned 
analysis has been applied by the Minnesota Supreme Court as the 
basis for upholding the right to a jury trial in a variety of civil 
contexts.36 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has long recognized that the 
right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution is co-
extensive with the right to a jury that existed at the time of its 
adoption in 1857: 
The doctrine of this court . . . has uniformly been that the 
effect of this constitutional provision is merely to continue 
unimpaired and inviolate the right of trial by jury as it existed in 
the territory at the time of the adoption of the constitution; that it 
neither added to nor took away from that right . . . .37 
 
 36. Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W. 2d 342 (Minn. 2002) (OSHA 
claims); Tyroll v. Private Label Chems., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn. 1993) 
(subrogation claim) (citing Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 433, 35 
N.W.2d 719, 734 (1949)); Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 340, 252 
N.W.2d 107, 118 (1977) (legal malpractice); Smith v. Bailen, 258 N.W.2d 118, 119 
(Minn. 1977) (paternity); Fiwka v. Johannes, 287 Minn. 247, 250, 177 N.W.2d 782, 
783 (1970) (negligence); Landgraf v. Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323, 326, 126 N.W.2d 
766, 768 (1964) (employment contract); Roske v. Ilykanyics, 232 Minn. 383, 389, 
45 N.W. 2d 769, 774 (1951) (quasi-contract); King v. Int’l Lumber Co., 156 Minn. 
494, 495, 195 N.W. 450, 451 (1923) (landlord/tenant); Williams v. Howes, 137 
Minn. 462, 463, 162 N.W. 1049, 1049 (1917) (the right to a jury trial is determined 
by the nature of the controversy described in the complaint); Pierce v. Maetzold, 
126 Minn. 445, 451, 148 N.W. 302, 303 (1914) (action on an administratrix’s 
bond); Shipley v. Belduc, 93 Minn. 414, 416, 101 N.W. 952, 953 (1904) (noting 
“the decisive test whether an action is triable to the court or to a jury is to be 
determined upon an examination of the complaint”); St. Paul & Sioux City R.R. v. 
Gardner, 19 Minn. 132, 137 (1872) (dispute in bailment proceeding was a case at 
law that required a jury trial); Olson v. Aretz, 346 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984) (legal malpractice).  Pearson is the only case contra, likening civil 
commitment to an equitable action for “guardianship in probate court” to which a 
jury trial right does not attach.  205 Minn. 545, 557,  287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939), 
aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).  However, the Pearson court includes no historical 
analysis or reference to Territorial Laws, which clearly created a right to a jury trial 
in probate court.  See infra notes 40 & 43. 
 37. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 47 Minn. 451, 453, 50 N.W. 598, 599 (1891) 
(emphasis added).  See also Morton Brick & Tile Co. v. Sodergren, 130 Minn. 252, 
254, 153 N.W. 527, 528 (1915); State ex. rel. Wilcox v. Gilbert, 126 Minn. 95, 103, 
147 N.W. 953, 957 (1914); In re Peters, 119 Minn. 96, 101-02, 137 N.W. 390, 392 
(1912); State v. Dist. Judge of Tenth Judicial Dist., 85 Minn. 215, 217-18, 88 N.W. 
742, 743 (1902); State ex. rel. Clapp v. Minn. Thresher Mfg. Co., 40 Minn. 213, 
8
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That this doctrine retains its vitality in the modern era is not 
subject to serious question.  The Minnesota courts have consistently 
held that failure to provide a jury trial, guaranteed by the 
Minnesota Constitution, is reversible error.38  Further, legislative 
enactments that grant the court discretion to deny the right to a 
jury trial, otherwise guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution, are 
invalid.39 
Given the long history of the common law right to a jury in 
civil commitment cases, and the ubiquity of the right in state 
constitutions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a strong 
argument could be made that such a right must also have been part 
of the common law of the Minnesota Territory.  However, such 
historical guesswork is not necessary since the right to a jury trial in 
civil commitment proceedings was actually codified in the 
Territorial Statutes of 1851 in a manner that parallels the ancient 
common law procedure of a Chancellor’s Commission/jury trial 
procedure described above: 
Sec. 17. The judge of probate of the county, has the care 
and custody of the person and property of idiots, lunatics, 
and other persons of unsound mind; . . . all of whom are 
known in the statute, as insane persons or habitual 
drunkards. 
 *  *  * 
Sec. 22. The judge of probate must also issue a citation to 
the insane person or drunkard, to appear at the time and 
place specified, and show cause, if any he have, against the 
application . . . . 
Sec. 23. At the time and place appointed . . . the judge of 
probate must attend, and draw and impannel [sic] a jury 
of six persons in the same manner as a jury is drawn and 
impanneled [sic] by a justice of the peace, for the trial of 
civil actions . . . . 
Sec. 24. The judge of probate must preside at trial, and 
decide all questions of law arising therein; and the trial 
must be conducted in all respects like a trial in a civil 
action. . . . 
Sec. 26.  The inquisition of the jury must be in writing, 
 
216, 41 N.W. 1020, 1021 (1889); In re Peck, 38 Minn. 403, 405, 38 N.W. 104, 106 
(1888). 
 38. See generally Landgraf v. Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323, 126 N.W.2d 766 (1964). 
 39. Westerlund v. Peterson, 157 Minn. 379,  388, 197 N.W. 110, 113 (1924). 
9
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and subscribed by the jury, or the foreman thereof, . . . 
the judge of probate must instruct the jury as to the form 
of the inquisition . . . but he can take no part in the 
deliberations of the jury, nor advise them . . . . 
Sec. 27. If the jury finds . . . the conditions mentioned in 
section seventeen, the judge must immediately appoint 
one or more guardians . . . If the jury find . . . no sufficient 
reason for the appointment of guardians, the application 
must be dismissed.40 
The procedure established by the Territorial Laws provides a 
very close parallel to the procedure used at common law in the 
sense that an initial petition would be heard by a court of equity to 
make the initial determination whether there was a basis for the 
petition, and to provide immediate equitable relief to protect the 
subject of the petition, or others, should the situation warrant.41  
Also, like the common law, an initial, temporary commitment 
could not be made indefinite without a jury verdict to determine 
the facts upon which the longer-term commitment was based.42 
The historical record seems quite clear.  In the Minnesota 
Territories, the probate court was given original jurisdiction over 
civil commitment matters.  Although probate matters often do not 
have a right to jury trial, the Territorial Laws made clear that a jury 
was required when the Probate Court took up long civil 
commitment matters.43  Whether the reason for this apparent 
combination of equitable jurisdiction with the right to a jury was an 
early example of the modern trend toward minimizing the divide 
between law and equity in a general sense,44 or resulted from an 
attempt to create a parallel to the common law system,45 there can 
be no question that the right existed.46  Thus, following an initial 
 
 40. REVISED STAT. OF THE TERRITORY OF MINN., Ch. 69, Art. III, §§ 17, 22-24, 26-
27 (1851). 
 41. See supra notes 18-21 and discussion. 
 42. See supra Part II. 
 43. See REVISED STAT. OF THE TERRITORY OF MINN., Ch. 69, Art. III, § 23 (1851). 
 44. See generally Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); see also 
Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
 45. See supra notes 18-21, 40 and discussion.  
 46. This commingling of equitable jurisdiction and the right to a jury trial on 
certain important issues can also be seen in the requirement that paternity 
matters, usually heard in association with marriage dissolution matters in a court 
of equity, also were accorded the right to a jury trial in the Territories, and have 
been protected in the Minnesota Constitution.  See Smith v. Bailen, 258 N.W.2d 
118, 220 (Minn. 1977). 
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emergency commitment, which can be decided by a court of equity 
alone, it would seem that indefinite, longer-term commitments 
must be decided by a jury under the Minnesota Constitution, even 
today. 
IV. THE DISAPPEARING RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
If the jury trial right in civil commitment proceedings was so 
clearly established in 1857, the question is: how could such a 
fundamental right have been overlooked for so long?  The answer, 
if one can be found, must be in Minnesota Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in the years between 1857 and the Pearson opinion in 
1939.  The complete judicial record on this question amounts to 
only two cases: Vinstad  (a 1926 case) and Pearson itself. 
Ironically, in Vinstad,47 the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld 
the use of a jury.  In Pearson, the court interpreted Vinstad as 
holding that the right to a jury did not apply to civil commitments.48  
A close examination of these two cases seems to explain how this 
egregious error came to pass. 
Both Vinstad and Pearson involved challenges to procedures in 
civil commitment proceedings authorized under statutes passed by 
the legislature in the early part of the twentieth century.  In 
Vinstad,49 the petitioner was civilly committed in 1921 under a 
statute that put commitment matters into the hands of an entity 
called the “Board of Control.”  This Board apparently was vested 
with statutory power to accept civil commitment petitions, which 
were then litigated in probate court.50  The Petitioner was a woman 
who had been civilly committed under these procedures. 
 
 47. 169 Minn. 264, 211 N.W. 12 (1926).  The petitioner was civilly committed 
as “feeble minded” in 1921, pursuant to sec. 8953-8972, G.S. 123 (ch. 344, Laws of 
1917, as amended by ch. 77, Laws of 1919 and ch. 260, Laws of 1923). 
 48. 205 Minn. 545, 557, 287 N.W. 297 303 (1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).  
In Pearson, the petitioner was civilly committed as a “psychopathic personality” 
pursuant to ch. 369, section 2, Laws of 1939 which provides that: 
Except as otherwise herein or hereafter provided, all laws now in force 
or effect hereafter enacted relating to insane persons, to persons 
alleged to be insane, and to persons found to be insane, shall apply 
with like force and effect to persons having a psychopathic 
personality. . . .  
See id. at 546-47, 287 N.W. at 298. 
 49. The commitment in Vinstad proceeded under Minn. G.S. ch. 344 (1917); 
Minn. G.St., ch. 77, (1919), neither of which mentioned the right to a jury trial 
recognized in the 1857 Minnesota Constitution. 
 50. Vinstad, 205 Minn. at 13, 287 N.W. at 264. 
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After four years of involuntary confinement, Ms. Vinstad, 
apparently acting pro se, petitioned the probate court to restore her 
capacity in 1925.51  The proceedings in probate court resulted in a 
denial of her petition.52  Under the statutory provisions then in 
effect, Ms. Vinstad appealed to district court for a trial de novo.53  At 
trial, the district court judge exercised judicial discretion to 
impanel a jury to assist the court in making this weighty decision, 
and a special verdict was submitted to a jury.54  The jury verdict was 
that Ms. Vinstad should be restored to her liberty and released 
from involuntary confinement.55 
The case reached the Minnesota Supreme Court when the 
Minnesota State Board of Control appealed the district court 
finding.  The Board of Control argued that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction because the right of appeal from the probate court 
resided only in the State Board of Control.  In addition, the Board 
of Control also objected to the use of a jury in the district court, 
because “original jurisdiction arose in the probate court,” a court 
that is usually “not equipped with jurors.”56 
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the argument that a 
civilly committed person lacked a right of appeal to the district 
court, which the court found was clearly set out in the relevant 
Minnesota statutes.57  Once this issue was decided, the court 
addressed the district court’s impaneling of a jury.  The court 
agreed that probate court matters, as a general rule, did not 
implicate a right to a jury.  There was no jury right because 
guardianship issues were within the original jurisdiction of the 
probate court, which was “not equipped with jurors, and as to 
which the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury does not apply.  
Nor is the question of guardianship triable by jury, as a matter of 
right, either in probate or district courts.”58 
However, the issue before the court was a challenge to the 
discretionary use of the jury in the district court proceeding, which 
the State Board of Control argued was improper, and to which the 
court replied, “[i]n a district court, where a jury is available, the 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 13, 287 N.W. at 266. 
 55. Id. at 13, 287 N.W. at 264. 
 56. Id. at 13, 287 N.W. at 266.  
 57. Id. at 13, 287 N.W. at 264.  
 58. Id. 
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court, in any action or proceeding triable to the court, may send an 
issue of fact to a jury for a special verdict.  It was within the 
discretion of the court to do so in the instant case.”59 
The holding with respect to the use of the jury in Vinstad 
merely upheld the discretion of the district court to use a jury, if 
the court chose to do so.  The language that refers to the right to a 
jury in probate court matters was dicta, and did no more than state 
the general proposition that probate court is usually a court of 
equity, in which a jury is not available. 
However, the court in Vinstad was not called upon to rule on 
whether the right to a jury existed in probate court commitment 
matters under the Laws of the Minnesota Territory or Art. 1, sec. 4 
of the Minnesota Constitution.  In its dicta regarding the right to a 
jury trial, as opposed to judicial discretion to use a jury if the 
district court chose, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to 
recognize that the right to a jury under the Minnesota Constitution 
does not depend on the general nature of the court that has 
jurisdiction over a particular question.  This error was compounded 
by the court some fifteen years later in Pearson, when the Vinstad 
right to a jury trial dicta was converted into binding Minnesota 
Supreme Court precedent.60 
In Pearson, the statute in question provided for civil 
commitment proceedings, which included: original jurisdiction in 
the probate court, judicial power to exclude the public from the 
hearing, discretionary appointment of counsel, witness subpoena 
power, and the right of appeal to district court.61  However, the 
statute did not include a right to a jury trial in probate court, and 
was silent as to the right to a jury in the district court appeal.62  The 
court rejected serious consideration of the jury trial issue, by citing 
Vinstad: 
If the relator has a right to a jury trial, it is because such 
was provided at common law when our constitution was 
adopted.  While no one has contended that ‘psychopathic 
personalities’ were confined and treated at common law, 
the claim has been made that the issue of idiocy was, in 
early times, decided by a jury.  The other view is that if 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. State ex. rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 
287 N.W. 297 (1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940). 
 61. Id. at 547, 287 N.W. at 298 (citing 3 Mason Minn. 1938 St., Supp. 8992-
166, 8992-167, 8892-169 & 8992-170). 
 62. Ch. 369, sec. 2 (1939). 
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such ever was the case, the practice had been abandoned 
before our constitution was adopted.  That we are 
committed to the latter belief appears quite unequivocally 
from the language of this court in Vinstad v. State Board of 
Control . . . .63 
The assertion by the court, that the right to a jury in civil 
commitment matters had “been abandoned before our 
constitution was adopted”64 is supported by nothing more than the 
reference to Vinstad in the quotation above.  The court did not 
note that a jury was used in Vinstad, nor that the discussion of the 
right to a jury in that case was dicta, and was, itself, not supported 
by reference to anything other than general probate court/equity 
concepts.  This is the doctrinal foundation upon which the 
Minnesota Supreme Court rejection of the right to a jury trial in 
civil commitment matters has rested without meaningful challenge 
for more than sixty years. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not purport to examine 
the jury trial right that existed in Minnesota Territory in either 
Vinstad or Pearson.  Neither case claims to have made any historical 
analysis at all, much less any reference to the Territorial Laws of 
Minnesota.  Thus, the rejection of the right to a jury trial exists 
because of the court’s apparent innocence of any awareness of the 
right to a jury trial existing in the Territorial Laws of Minnesota.65  
Had the court been made aware that the Territorial Laws required 
probate courts to impanel a jury, it could not have ruled as it did 
and remain faithful to the method of interpreting the right to a 
jury in the 1857 constitution that has been consistently applied in 
every other case that has come before the court.  Similarly, the 
opinion of the United States Supreme Court, which upholds the 
standards for civil commitment under that Minnesota statute, made 
no inquiry into Territorial Law,66 and there is no record that any 
court has addressed the issue since 1940.67 
 
 63. Pearson at 557, 287 N.W. at 303. 
 64. Id. 
     65.    See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 66. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 
270 (1940).    
     67.    Although no published opions discuss the jury trial issue, at least one 
unpublished opinion, In re Anderson, 1998 WL 727734 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 
1998) relied on Pearson. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
It seems plain that a terrible mistake has been made in 
Minnesota, which has resulted in Minnesota diverging from long-
standing common law principles, and from almost all other states 
with respect to the fundamental right to be judged by a jury before 
the government can deprive people of their liberty.  This mistake 
occurred because the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the right 
to a jury under the Minnesota Constitution in Pearson without 
examination of the right as it existed in 1857.  In light of the 
unbroken line of cases, which hold that the right to a jury that 
existed in Minnesota Territory in 1857 and which liberally interpret 
the right to a jury being retained in modern causes of action, there 
can be little doubt that the current court will soon be called upon 
to correct this serious long-standing denial of a fundamental right. 
The current court has several choices: (1) accept the 
unchangeable historical record and recognize the previously 
ignored right to jury trial; or (2) continue to reject the right to a 
jury trial by: (a) finding an historical record that discounts the 
provisions of the Territorial Laws; (b) distinguishing the type of 
civil commitment addressed in the Territorial Laws from those 
presently in use; or (c) rejecting 160 years of its own doctrine which 
has clearly established that the jury trial right in the Territories 
exists unchanged in the 1857 Minnesota Constitution. 
There is only one course of action that is doctrinally 
consistent, and which reflects the integrity worthy of the court: in 
the near future, the Minnesota Supreme Court must hold that all 
those currently being held against their will in civil confinement 
will have to be released, or jury trials will have to be held for those 
who do not waive their right to challenge their continuing 
confinement.  Furthermore, in the very near future, it will be 
necessary for all new civil commitment proceedings to be held 
before juries, if the right is not waived. 
Of course, the right to a jury trial in these civil commitment 
proceedings will arise only when the State seeks to extend 
temporary, short-term civil confinement into long-term indefinite 
confinement.  This means that initial commitment proceedings 
under current statutes will not change appreciably.68  However, 
 
 68. Although precise figures are not available as of this writing, some 2,000 
persons are presently being civilly confined in Minnesota and none have had jury 
trials or been given the opportunity to waive the right.  Some significant portion of 
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before an indefinite, long-term commitment can be ordered by a 
court, a jury of at least six persons will have to be impaneled in a 
procedure that mirrors other civil causes of action in which a jury 
trial is required. 
While there is no certainty that juries will reach different 
conclusions than probate court judges on the same facts, it is clear 
that the decision to bring a petition seeking indefinite, long-term 
civil commitment will have much different consequences for 
county attorneys, defense counsel, and the trial court.  Jury trials in 
both the criminal and civil context usually require commitment of 
greater resources for all parties than those generally associated with 
bench trials.  The decision to seek indefinite commitment will be 
far more costly and complicated for all parties concerned.  In 
addition, the impaneling of a jury adds an element of 
unpredictability into the decision-making process that gives defense 
counsel a means to encourage opposing counsel to resolve 
contested matters to avoid an unexpected jury verdict.  Perhaps 
most importantly, all parties will likely benefit from a more careful 
preparation and presentation of the evidence and judicial rulings 
in the conduct of the proceedings and opportunities to exercise 
unreviewable discretion will be reduced.  It is also likely that post-
commitment procedures, which require additional jury findings to 
continue indefinite confinement, will result in post-confinement jury 
procedures far more exacting than those currently in place. 
For more than sixty years, persons facing involuntary civil 
commitment have been deprived of the right to a jury trial, which is 
enjoyed by all criminal defendants facing confinement.  In spite of 
a long common law history upholding the right to a jury trial 
whenever the liberty of a person is at issue, and an unbroken line 
of Minnesota Supreme Court cases that holds that the right to a 
civil jury trial, which existed in the Minnesota Territories, remains 
unchanged in the Minnesota Constitution, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court rejected the right to a jury trial in civil commitment 
proceedings in Pearson.  Notwithstanding that opinion, it is quite 
clear that the Minnesota Territorial Laws required juries to be 
impaneled before the liberty of anyone could be taken by the State 
of Minnesota.  As a result, it is likely that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court will soon be faced with overturning Pearson and returning 
 
these persons may be confined against their will, and are likely to seek release.  
Telephone Interview with Ms. Fran Bly, Director, State Operated Services Support 
Division, Minnesota Department of Human Services (Feb. 19, 2003). 
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Minnesota to a civil commitment procedure employing jury trials 
that were required under the common law, and which exist in 
nearly every other state.  The right to a jury trial in civil 
commitment proceedings is likely to be reestablished in Minnesota 
in the very near future. 
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